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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATION OF MUNICIPAL
DEBTS.
[Third and last part]
MONEYS

IN

THE TREASURY.

We have seen that authority to create a debt which, alone, or
added to existing debts, is more than 2 per cent of the valuation
The
of property, must be obtained from the people by a vote.
first step is the decision by the authorities of the city, borough,
county, school district, etc., that an increase of debt is desired.
The election is not to be had until after the corporate authorities,
"by their ordinance or vote, shall have signified a desire to make
such increase of indebtedness."' The desire may be expressed
If the expression takes the form of an
by "ordinance or vote."
ordinance, it will not be necessary that it should be valid as an
ordinance. It is enough if it expresses the desire by the vote
which adopted it.'
NOTICE.

When the corporate authorities have signified the desire to
increase the debt, they are to"give notice during at least 30 days,
by weekly avertisments in the newspapers, not exceeding 3 in
each district; and, if no newspapers be published therein, by at
least 20 printed handbills posted in the most public parts thereof, of an election"' to be held on a day by them to be fixed, for
the purpose of obtaining the assent of the electors to the proposed

'Act June 9, 1891; 3 Stewart, Purd. 2723; Act May 1, 1909, P. L. 317"
'Jacobs v. East Bangor Borough, 8 North. 19.
'Act May 1, 1909; P. L. 317.
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increase of indebtedness. Henderson P.J. is of the opinion that
the advertisement must appear in 3 newspapers if there are so
many published in the city, borough, county, etc.' Kunkle, J.,
thinks otherwise. "One newspaper, published in the English
language, may perhaps be sufficient." One newspaper in the
German language is not enough. If a regular advertisement
occurs in a German paper, and an advertisement for a part of the
30 days occurs in an English paper, (The Harrisburg Telegraph)
and for another part in another English paper, (The Star Independent) the two last may be regarded as an advertisement in
one paper, and this together with the advertisement in the German paper, is enough.' The notice in Witherop v. Titusville
School Board' was published in the Morning Herald on June 6,
27, 28, 29 and 30, and on July 1. The election was to be held
on July 12. The notice was printed in the Sunday World on
June, 5, 12, 19, 26, and on July 3, and in the American Citizen
on June 10, 17, 24, and on July 1. There was an interval of 3
weeks between the first and second appearance of the notice in
the Morning Herald. The last notice in the Sunday World was
9 days, and that in the American Citizen 11 days before the
election. It is doubtful, therefore, thought Henderson, P. J.,
whether the publication in the two last named papers was sufficient. Compliance with the statutory requirement of notice is a
condition precedent to the right or power to issue bonds, or increase the debt. Hence, in the case last cited, the court restrained the carrying out of the contract for the erection of a school

building.!
'Witherop v. Titusville School Dist. 7 C. C. 451.
5
Harrisburg City v. Dauphin Deposit Bank, -7 C.C. 401; 12 Dist. 207.
The election was to be held Feb. 18, 1902. The Star Independent pub-

lished it Jan. 18, and weekly thereafter, until, and including Feb. 8. It
omitted the notice on Feb. 15. The Telegraph first published the notice
Jan. 20; it published it again Jan. 25, Feb. 1, Feb. 8, Feb. 15.
&7C. C. 451.
7
Reference is made to the possibility that the "light vote"cast at the
election was not due to the want of notice and that abundant actual notice
had been given. In Harrisburg City v. Dauphin Deposit Bank, 27 C. C.

401, the court on case stated held the election sufficient to make the bonds
valid, remarking that the measure was advocated on the hustings, inthe
daily papers, and discussed in the community; the vote cast indicates a
general diffusion of knowledge of the impending election, among the
electors.
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CONTENTS OF THU NOTICE.

The notice to be given by newspaper or handbill, must
"contain a statement of the amount of the existing debt, of the
amount and percentage of the proposed increase, and of the purposes for which the indebtedness is to be increased. In Bloomsburg Town Election Case,' Ikeler, P. J., enjoined the holding
of an election, because, inlerialia, there were stated several purposes for which the debt was to be increased; viz, to fund an existing floating debt of $12,500; to pay an existing judgment for
tort against the town, to establish an electric light plant, to pay
damages and expenses of opening two streets. "An ordinance"
he remarks, "which lets loose upon the voters of the town of
Bloomsburg the excitement and expense of an election upon
these several independent questions of town policy and administration, with no power or privilege to discriminate between them,
but compels them to vote for the whole or none, is not warranted
by the constitution, or by statute law, but is opposed by both."
Other courts have not had similar" scruples. Thus, no animadversion was made on a vote to increase debt for the public improvement of streets of a borough, for the erection or purchase of
water works, and electric lighting plantsor on a vote to telford four
district roads; to drain and grade five other streets ° or on a
proposal to borrow $12,200,000, for 18 different purposes." If
the notice states the objects of the increase of debt of a school district differently from the vote of the school board expressive of
the desire of the authorities to increase the debt, the election will
be declared illegal and set aside by the court of quarter sessions" 2
unless the discrepancy is the result of a clerical error; is unintentional, and is not serious. It was not found serious when the
ordinance correctly stated the valuation at $358,735, and the
percentage of increase 5.296, and the advertisement stated the
valuation as $538,735, and the percentage as 3.545. An injunction against using the bonds was dissolved. 3
818 C. C. 449. cf. Barr v. Phila.; 191 Pa. 438.
9Howard's Appeal, 162 Pa. 374. Pennypacker. J., thinks he avoids
difficulty by saying that the voter does not vote for the objects for which
the increase of debt is to be made, but for the increase; upon one subject
therefore; Barr v. Philadelphia, 191 Pa. 438.
'"Major v. Aldan, 209 Pa. 247.
"Barr v. Phila., 191 Pa. 438.
12In re Red Lyon School District; 14 Dist. 858.
3Jacob v. East Bangor Borough, 8 North. 19.
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EFFECT OF DESIGNATION OF PURPOSE OF INCREASE OF DEBT.

It would be more than idle to require the object or purpose
of an increase of debt to be stated to the voter, as well as the
proposed amount of increase of debt, if having been by the proposed object persuaded to vote the loan, it could lawfully be
used for some other purpose. The purpose is stated in the notice.
It is in a brief form, repeated in the ballot. Not of much significance then, is the statement of Pennypacker, J. that "nowhere
is it indicated that they [the electors] are to assent to or dissent
from the purpose or purposes for which the moneys are to be
utilized." The voters, he says, are aided to vote"intelligently"
upon the question of increase of debt.14 They vote intelligently
only when they know for what proposed object this proposed debt
is sought to be made and they as much approve the object as the
debt. The two are inseparable: to approve the debt without approving the object, would bestupid,andto approve the object without approving the debt, equally so. A similar statement is made
by Brown, J."5 "Neither" he remarks, "in the constitution nor
in the act of assembly regulating the election is there any provision that the electors shall pass upon the purpose of the loan,"
but he virtually retracts the observation when he afterwards adds,
"In voting for the increase the electors have the right to assume,
and vote accordingly, that their representatives will expend the
money for the purpose for which they asked it. To permit them
to do otherwise would be to permit them to practice fraud and
deception upon their trusting constituents, and when an attempt
is made by those in authority to so violate faith with the people,
they will be halted by a chancellor." '
In short, the bonds issued without the approval of the people, will be void; the attempted use of the moneys procured by their sale, for uses
different from those approved by the people, in voting for the
increased debt, will be pervented at their instance by the chancellor. There can be no increase of the debt beyond the amount
of increase designated in the notice.17
"Barr v. Phila., 191 Pa. 488.
'6Major v. Aldan Borough, 209 Pa. 247.
"Major v. Aldan Borough, 209 Pa. 247.
"Witherop v. Titusville Dist. 7 C. C. 451.
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DEVIATIONS

103

FROM THE ANNOUNCED OBJECT OF

TEE INCREASE

The city, borough, county authorities may make immaterial
and unavoidable departures from the published object of the increase of debt, without incurring an injunction at the suit of a
tax-payer. An increase of the borough debt by $17,500 was
proposed by the council for the niaking of improvements thus
described; Grading and telfording Providence road $8,000;grading telfording and resurfacing Oak Lane, $700; grading, telfording, and resurfacing Springfield road, $5,000; grading, telfordiug
The increase of debt
and resurfacing Clifton Avenue, 2,000."
advertised for bids.
the
council
by
the
voters,
approved
being
The specifications provided that, on the sub-grade as prepared a
telford pavement is to be laid. The foundation course is to consist of irregular shaped, hard, tough and durable stone, laid by
hand so as to break joints as far as possible. They must be six
inches deep, 6 to 10 inches long, 4 to 6 inches wide, and must be
placed on their broadest edges and lengthwise across the roadway.
All the irregularities of the upper part of the foundation must be
broken off with rapping hammers, and the interstices filled up
with stone chips, making this layer when complete, a firm substantial and even pavement 6 inches deep. The authorities with
the money voted were unable to make a contract in strict conformity with these specifications. They therefore made a contract,
providing that upon the subgrade a pavement is to be laid. "The
foundation course is to consist of irregular shaped, hard, tough and
durable slag of size and quality to be approved by the highway
committee, 8 inches deep, and repeatedly rolled with a roller
weighing not less than 15 tons, until it forms a foundation at
least 6 inches deep." The original specification remained unaltered as to what was to be put upon this foundation. Brown,
J., on a bill to restrain the borough from carrying out the new
contract, observed that the only difference between it and the
original, was in respect to the bottom construction, and that the
court below had found that a telford construction of slag of the
size, shape and laid in the same manner as natural stone would
constitute a telford pavement. "As far as the end to be reached
is concerned, I am of the opinion that if a solid foundation is
procured under the same circumstances the one is as good as the
other." That is, if the court thinks the pavement to be furnished
is as good as that contemplated by the voters, and of the same

104

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

species[eg. a telford pavement.] the voters must submit to the
use of their money upon the payement not approved by them,
but approved by the chancellor. 8
THE ELECTION HELD.

The election is to be held at the place, time, and under the
same regulations as provided by law for the holding of municipal
elections. The act of April 20, 1874, and the act of June 9,
189 1, required that the tickets to be used by the elector, should be
either written or printed, that they should be labeled on the outside
"Increase the debt' ; and should contain on the inside the words

"No increase of debt",or"Debt may be increased" and also a brief
The act of
statement of the purpose and amount of increase.
June 10, 1893 P. L. 419, which intcr alia, requires the voter to
signify his will concerning questions submitted to him, on the
same ballot as that which names candidates for office, is unconstitutional, in so far as it applies to votes upon increase of debt,

because its title gives no notice, that such subject will be dealt
with in it. " The act of April 29, 1903 P. L. 338, which is constitutional' requires the question [ of increase of debt or other ]
to be printed on the ballot in brief form and followed by the
words "yes" and "no".

If candidates for office are being voted

for also, the question must be printed after the list of candidates.
An election in 1906, in which the electors used ballots of the form
prescribed by the act of 1891, was void, and the issue of bonds
in pursuance of it was enjoined. 2' The act of May 1, 190922
"8Major v. Aldan Borough 209 Pa. 247.

The voters, however, simply

approved of the debt, for grading, telfording and surfacing. Further
specification was not found in the notice of the election, or in the ballots.

The first specifications were made after the election. The real question
then was not that which the court spent much time upon; viz whether the
expressed will of the people could be departed from, but whether having
made an unsuccessful effort to secure a contract with one set of specifications, the council could enter into a contract the specifications of which
were somewhat different.
"Evans v. Willistown Township, 168 Pa. 578 Hence an election held in
1894 to increase the debt in which the voters used separate ballots, as the
act of
1891 required, was not for that reason invalid.
20
McLaughlin v. Summit Hill Borough, 224 Pa. 425; Oughton v. Black,
212 Pa.1; Holtzman v. Braddock, 14 Dist. 547; Conshohocken Borough v.
County Commissioners, 14 Dist. 141.
21McLaughlin v. Summit Hill Borough, 224 Pa. 425; Holzman v. Braddock, 14 Dist. 547. Ballots must be furnished by the county commissioners; not by the borough authorities, 224 Pa. 425. The commissioners will
be compelled by mandamus to print the ballots to be used in a borough
where a vote on increase of debt is to be taken, in the form prescribed by
the act of April 29 1903, P. L. 338; Conshohocken Borough v. County
Commissioners; 14 Dist. 141.
22P. L. 317.
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concerning increase of indebtedness seems to change once more
the law concerning ballots. It says that it shall be the duty
of the inspectors "to receive tickets, and to deposit said tickets
in a box provided for that purpose, as is provided by law in
regard to other tickets received at said election and tickets so
received shall be counted." No provision is made for the form
of 'the tickets.
May they be written or printed?
Must
they state the object of the increase of the debt? Must they
state the amount of increase? How is the assent or dissent of
the voter to be manifested? "
RETURN OF ELECTION.

The tickets received by the inspectors, are to be counted,
and a return thereof made to the clerk of the Court of Quarter
Sessions of the proper county, duly certified as is required by law
together with a certified copy of the ordinance and the advertisement. 2 In receiving and counting, and in making returns
of the votes cast, the inspectors, judges and clerks of the election
shall be governed by the laws of the state regulating municipal
elections; and the vote shall be counted by the court as is now
provided by general laws governing municipal elections. So
says the act of May 1, 1909: as said the act of June 9, 1901.
But, it has been decided that this language does not require that
the vote of a borough or township should be counted by court
of quarter sessions, or any other. The requirement that the vote
shall be computed by the court can refer only to elections in
cities. In township and borough elections, the returns are
simply directed to the clerk of quarter sessions, delivered into
his office and filed there.25 The language of the act of 1891, re2In
In re Red Lyon School District, 14 Dist., 858, it seems to have
been assumed that the act of 1891 still regulated in 1905, the form of ballot, in votes on increase of debt. The election was set aside by the Quarter Sessions, because the ballot did not contain a statement of the purpose
and amount of the increase of debt; no tally of the votes polled was kept
and attached to the returns, and the purpose of the increase set forth in
the resolution of the school board was different from that set forth in the
public notice. But in Fowler v. Gable, 3 Dist. 23, the jurisdiction of the
court to entertain a petition to contest an election on increase of indebtedness was denied.
"Act May 1, 1909; P. L. 317. "Ordinance" here includes the vote of
such authorities, e.g. supervisors, county commissioners, school directors,
as do not act by ordinance; and the votes of council not in the form of
ordinance. Jacobs v. East Bangor Borough, 8 North. 19.
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peated in the act of 1909, Weiss, J.,remarks," whatever changes
the amendment [of the act of 1874] may have intended to effect,
its phraseology renders it inoperative, and defeats its intent."
Hence he declined, as judge of the QuarterSessions, to compute
the vote cast in the
Borough of Steelton, upon the increase of
6
its indebtedness.2

NUMBERING BALLOTS.

The 4th section of Article VIII of the constitution [since
changed by the Amendment of November5, 1901]requiring that
the ballots be numbered, was held inapplicable to a vote upon
the increase of indebtedness. But, even if the constitution applied, an election would not be declared illegal and invalid,
because the ballots had not been numbered, everything else being
regular, honest and fair.27 -In Clark v. Luzerne Borough' a
preliminary injunction against incurring debt after a vote of the
electors was issued, and the Supreme Court refused to interfere
with it, where the bill and inj unction affidavits averred that legal
notice of the election had not been given, that the tickets used
did not state the purpose and amount of the debt, that they were
not numbered, nor deposited in the proper box, that no voting
list of electors had been kept, and that the ordinance authorizing
the election had not been passed at a legal meeting of council;
that its title was misleading, and that it had not been duly published.
ACTING UPON THE ELECTION

The corporate authorities, signifying "a desire to make'the
inciease of indebtedness, are to appoint an election, give notice
for 30 days of it, etc. and, if the vote is favorable to the increase
they may then resolve upon the increase or not, as they deem
best. From the use of the word "desire" it cannot be legitimately
inferred that only the same councils, school boards, board of
county commissioners, etc. as expressed the desire for the vote,
2

1Clough v. Shreve, 10 C. C. 398. An injunction against increasing
the debt of the borough of Union City was refused notwithstanding that
the returns of election had not been computed by the quarter sessions.
26
Steelton Borough Election, 22 C. C.593; 8 Dist. 545. The act of
April 29, 1903 required the vote to be on the same ballot as that for officers.
2

7Rebman v. School District of Crafton, 201 Pa. 437.
'8196 Pa. 210.
29Act May 1, 1909, P. L. 317,
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and appointed the election, can resolve, after the election to make
increase of indebtedness.
Were that so, the death of a single member would render the whole proceeding abortive. It is
intimated by Pennypacker, P. J., that the final step to increase
the debt ought to be taken within a year from the date of the
election.'
REPEATING ELRCTION.

If the decision of the electors is against the increase of debt,
"no other election on the 'same subject' shall be held in that
municipality for one year from the date of such preceding election." " The "same subject" is, the increase of debt; any increase
of debt. A second election to increase debt, within the year, is
forbidden, although the amount of proposed increase, and the
objects of the increase, are different. The first electioti having
been held on Feb. 17, 1903, a second held Feb. 16, 1904, is void
although both elections were held concurrently with the regulai
spring elections of the year. Hence, the second election having
approved of the increase, the court will at the suit of a taxpayer
enjoin against making the increase. "
PROVISION FOR TAX.

The 1st, section of the act of 1897; P. L. 18, repeating the
language of the 2d, section of the act of April 20, 1874, provides
that when the debt to be increased is less than 2 percentum, and
no election is therefore necessary, coupon bonds or other securities may be issued, the principal of which shall be reimbursable at period not exceeding 30 years from the date at which the
issue is authorized, "and an annual tax commencing the first
year after such debt shall be increased or incurred, sufficient for
the payment of the interest thereon, and the principal of such
debt within a period not exceeding 30 years from the date of

such increase, shall be forthwith assessed."

This tax must be

assessed before the issue of the bonds and the issue of them be-

fore the assessment of the tax, will be enjoined by the court"and
3°Barr v. Phila., 191 Pa. 438.

USect 1, Act of May 11, 1897. P. L. 53.
"Keppleman v. City of Reading, 14 Dist. 61.
"3Brucev. Pittsbung, 166 Pa. 152; Witherop v. Titusville School Board,
7 C. C. 451. The act of 1874, required that the tax should be "equal to
at least 8 percentum" of the principal of the debt. That 8 percentum of
annually will more than pay the loan in the time it runs, 30 years, is no
reason for disregarding the mandate, 166 Pa. 152.
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if issued, there can be no recovery upon it."4 A provision ih the
ordinance directing the making and sale of the bonds, to the
effect that until the bonds shall be fully paid "there shall be
levied, assessed and collected annually and at the same time and
in the same manner that other taxes are collected, a tax sufficient
to pay the interest on said bonds, and also 3Y2 per cent of the
total amount of such bonds, to be appropriated and applied
as a sinking fund for the payment of said bonds, when and as
they may become due and payable," is not equivalent to the levy
of such a tax. It is a mere promise to levy such a tax.
ESTOPPEL AGAINST ALLEGING THAT NO TAX WAS ASSESSED

If before a sale of bonds, the borough files the statement in
the office of the clerk of quarter sessions, to which elsewhere we
have made reference, and therein avers that it has levied a tax for
and adequate for the payment thereof, statingthe tax, thebuyer
of the bonds may enforce them, although in fact an adequate
tax had not been assessed."
REDEMPTION OF BONDS IN INSTALMENTS.

Payment of the principal of the debt not more than 30 years
after its formation must be provided for; but it is not necessary
that it be made redeemable, annually, in installments, the last
not deferred more than 30 years. The municipality has a discretion whetherto makeit thus partially redeemable at intervals within
the 30years, or to postpone redemption, altogether, to the end of 30
years. Instead of paying off any portion of the bonds within 30years,
a sinking fund may be accumulated by the fruits of the taxation.
The "intent of the act is that a certain sum shall be annually raised
in anticipation of payment, and whether paid out in redemption
of the bonds annually, or paid into the inviolably pledged fund
annually, to be paid out for the bonds in 30 years, it is, within the
the meaning of the act, applied annually to the redemption of
the bonds." 6
INADEQUACY

OF 'TAX.

If the tax is sufficient, at the issue of bonds, to provide for
their payment in the lawful time, the occurrence of circumstances
"'4Rainsburg Borough v. Fyan, 127 Pa. 74.
overy5 of money paid to the borough.

But there can be a rec-

5 Bell v. Waynesborough, 195 Pa. 299. So, the bonds having issued,
they may properly be taken up by a fresh issue of bonds.
:GBruce v. Pittsburg, 166 Pa. 152.
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subsequently, which so reduce the amount yielded by the tax, as
to render it inadequate, will have no effect upon the validity of
the bonds. "Thus if a city" says Mitchell, J., "at the time of
making a contract levies a special tax in good faith supposed to
be adequate to meet it, but in consequence of fire or flood or decline in values the result is an insufficient fund, it cannot be held
that the contract, good at its inception, would thereby be made
bad."" A bill in equity to restrain Scranton from issuing bonds
in 1904, the first semi-annual interest upon which fell due on
Jan. 1, 1905 was filed, on the ground that the tax provided would
not produce any means of paying that installment of interest
since the tax would not be collected until late in the year 1905.
The injunction was refused because (a) it had complied with the
law in getting ready to issue the bonds and(b) the city had other
means for paying the interest of Jan. 1, 1905.
The premium
obtained on the sale of the bonds was sufficient. "8 The subsequent
appropriation of the proceeds of the tax to other uses, could not
impair the bonds to whose payment it should have been applied.
Hence, bonds having been issued with a tax providing moneys
to be used in paying them, the diversion of these moneys does
not impair the validity of the bonds, and a new issue of bonds is
permissible to take them up."
WHEN PROVISION FOR TAX IS UNNECESSARY.

There are functions which municipalities must perform, even
though they incur a debt for a time, in performing them. If the
revenues that may reasonably be expected to come in, under existing taxes, during the year will be sufficient to extinguish
this debt, a special provision by tax, at the creation of it is
unnecessary. A county must meet the expenses of the courts,
jurors fees, etc.
The annual tax is not collected until the later
part of the year. It is desirable, if not necessary, to pay the
juries and others promptly. It may be necessary in order to do
this, to borrow the money. The county may therefore borrow,
issuing a promisory note or a bond for it, if it will be able to repay the money, from the revenues of the years; and it will not
be obliged to consume these revenues of the year, in extinguishing debts for ordinary expenses, that have accrued in earlier
years. The constitutional and statutory requirement that a
-

3t

Addyston Pipe Co. v. City of Correy, 197 Pa 41.
•Jermyn v. Scranton City, 212 Pa. 598.
39School District v. Lamprecht Bros. Co., 198 Pa. 504.
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special tax shall be levied, of at least 8 percentum of the debt,
refers only "to such debts as cannot be paid out of the ordinary
and regular taxes or other available revenues within the year."
It would be folly to assess a special tax for the payment of money
for whose payment the existing assessments are sufficient.'
The 8th section of Article IX of the Constitution, which requires
the assessment of an annual tax, at the creation of a debt, which
shall be sufficient in 30 years to pay the debt, cannot be applied
to the incidental and ordinary expenses of making and repairing
turn pike roads. - The indebtedness therein referred to is such as
may arise from some contract of the municipality itself, and
which, for some definite period, is to be interest-bearing."
THE CONSTITUTIONAL

REQUIREMENT OF TAx.

The 10th section of Article IX of the constitution provides
that "Any county, township, school district or other municipality incurring any indebtedness, shall at or before the time of so
doing, provide for the collection of an annual tax sufficient to
pay the interest and also the principal thereof within 30 years."
A contract by a borough for an electric light plant, which would
involve a debt of $4,968.50, the current revenues of the borough
applicable to which not being more than $1900, would need to
be accompanied by a provision for this tax.4"
LIMITATIONS ON THE TA:.ING POWER.

The existing limit upon the taxing power of the mnnicipality is not the measure of the debts which it may create. A borough, e. g. having the power by special act to tax to the amount
of 10 mills on the dollar, the proceeds of which tax would be comsumed in meeting the ordinary expenses, it is not for that reason
precluded from erecting water works, although, to do so, would
require an additional assessment of 32 mills.
The authority to
40 Commissioners of Schuylkill County v. Snyder, 20 Pa. C. C. 649.
Koch, J., says the municipality may anticipate to some extent the collection of its annual revenues. Otherwise boroughs and school districts
would during tIe first year of their existence be obliged to file a statment
in the office of the clerk of Quarter Sessions every time they purchased
a ton of coal or a box of chalk.
"Lehigh Coal v. Navig. Co's. Appeal, 112 Pa. 360; Davis v. Doyles
town, 3 C. C. 573.
12Davis v. Doylestown Borough, 3 C. C. 573. The making of the contract, without such provision, will be enjoined.
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increase the debt involves the right to increase the tax.43 Blairsville, by its charter was authorized to levy a tax not exceeding
one percentum on assessable property unless some object of
general utility should require the same, in which case the consent of the inhabitants in voting, must be obtained. The borough
undertook the erection of a market-house and a town-hall. A
tax of one percentum would yield only $1500.
The estimated
cost of the improvements was $4000. A bill filed to restrain the
borough authorities was dismissed."
SPECIAL AND GENERAL PRIOR LIMITATIONS ON DEBT-MAKING
POWER.

The act of June 9, 1891 P. L. 252,(3 Stewart's Purd. 2723)
enacted to carry into effect section 8, Art. IX of the constitution,
provides that " The indebtedness of any county, city, borough,
township, school district or other municipality or corporate district, in this commonwealth, may be authorized to be increased
to an amount exceeding 2 percentum * * * with the assent of the
electors, duly obtained at a public election, etc." This repealed
the limitation of debts to $1.00 on every $100 of the assessed
value, or the limitation of debts to $10,000, in the borough of
Bristol.45 The limitation of the debt of Pittsburg to $1,150,000,
imposed by the local act of April 6 1850, (P. L. 408) is repealed
by the constitution and the act of April 20, 1874, (whose terms
are in part repealed by the act of June 9, 1891.)"' The 66th section of the act of Feb. 12, 1869 (P. L. 150) which" prescribed
$50,000 as the maximum indebtedness of any sub-school district
in Pittsburg, is repealed by the act of April 20, 1874." The act
of April 9, 1868, after authorizing the borrowing of money by
county commissioners for the erection of public buildings, provides that before the loan is contracted, the commissioners shall
present a statement of the financial condition of the county to the
13Howard's Appeal, 162 Pa. 374; Appeal of City of Wilkes-Barre, 116
Pa. 246.
"Emerson v. Blairsville, 2 Pittsb. 39.
'Dorrance v. Bristol Borough, 224 Pa. 464. More accurately the
$10,000 limitation was repealed when Bristol fell under the general borough act, and the other limitation is repealed by the act of 1901.
"Bruce v. Pittsburg, 166 Pa. 152.
41Chalfont v. Edwards, 176 Pa., 67 Mellor v. Pittsburg, 201 Pa. 397. A
contrary decision, reached in Hutchinson's Appeal, 4 Penny. 84, was
erroneous.
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court of Quarter Sessions, and secure the approval of such' court
for the loan. The approval of the quarter sessions of Wayne
County of a loan, was refused by the court, [the president judge
approved; the 2 lay judges refused].
The dommissioners then
resolved to proceed under the act of April 20, 1874. They iled
a statement in the office of the clerk of Quarter Sessions, of a
purpose to increase the debt, and they assessed a tax of 13/ mills
to pay the interest, etc. A bill was filed to restrain them from
contracting the debt without the approval of the court of Quarter Sessions, and a special injunction was awarded. The supreme
court affirmed, on appeal, except so far as the injunction restrained from levying and collecting taxes under the general system
for levying and collecting county taxes for the building of a county
court-house.'
Under the acts of May 8, 1854 (P. L. 617),
April 21, 1871 (P. L. 241) and April 7, 1873 (P. L. 64), school
districts may contract loans for the purchase of grounds for school
houses, and for the erection of the houses. The directors may
borrow money not exceeding 5 per centum upon the last triennial valuation of property in the district, when authorized by the
Common Pleas Court. Shay, J., reached the conclusion that these
requirements were not repealed by the act of April 20, 1874 (P.
L. 65), in so far as it provides for an increase of debt not exceeding 2 per centum, etc. The approval of the loan by the Common
Pleas Court is necessary. 9
RSTOPPIL.

As in other cases, the plaintiff who seeks an injunction may
have estopped himself by his unreasonable delay in invoking the
aid of the court, or otherwise. He may, e. g., be passive while
the contract is being performed, and only at its completion intervene to prevent payment of the contractor.
Ignorance of the
making of the contract and of the doing of the work might excuse the delay."
'8Wayne County Commissioners' Appeal, 4 W. N. 411.
"9Coal and Iron Co. v. Porter Township School District, 14 Dist. 581.
But bonds being in the hands of innocent purchasers, and no proceedings
having been begun until nearly three months after their issue to restrain
such issue, the court will decree their issue nunc pro tune, when the
statement is presented to it.
5O'Malley v. Olyphant, 198 Pa. 525. The plaintiff resided elsewhere.
No estopping facts were found in Luburg's Appeal, 1 Mona. 329.
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REMEDIES FOR IMPROPER INCREASE OF DEBT.

A very common measure of redress for the illegal increase of
debt is the filing of a bill in equity. 5 A tax-payermay, forhimself alone,52 or for himself and other tax-pavers who may choose
to unite with him,53 file this bill. Seventeen citizens and taxpayers of a county filed a bill to restrain it.6
Various grounds
for the injunction are alleged, e. g., that the borough has no
power to build the water works, etc., in the building of which
the debt will arise;55 that, in the popular vote, proper ballots were
not used; 56 that the proposed debt being beyond 2 per centum,
its creation has not been submitted to the people;" that the ordinance providing for the vote, submitted the contraction of several distinct debts for as many objects; 5 because the vote was not
counted by the court; 9 because an 8 per cent tax was not assessed
before issue of the bonds;' because the ordinance providing for
the debt was defective."' These are only some of the reasons
urged for an injunction.
Sometimes the injunction is against
the making of the contract for the work which will involve the
creation of the debt, e. g., the erection of a water plant, 2 or the
5
'Dorrance v. Bristol, 224 Pa. 464; Bloomsburg Town Election Case,
18 C. C. 449; McKinnon v. Mertz, 225 Pa. 85.
52
McLaughlin v. Summit Hill Borough, 224 Pa. 426; O'Malley v. Olyphant, 198 Pa. 525; Keller v. Scranton, 220 Pa. 130.
5
"Sener v. Ephrata Borough, 176 Pa. 80; Wade v. Oakmont Borough,
165 Pa. 479; Clark v. Luzerne Borough, 196 Pa. 210; Peffer v. Phila., 181
Pa. 566; Reting v. Titusville, 175 Pa. 512.
5
Brown's Appeal, 111 Pa. 72. The Quarter Sessions where the borough statement is filed, as required by the act of April 20, 1874, has not
jurisdiction over the subject of increasing the debt. Hence, a remonstrance filed in that court, against the borough's proceeding to increase
the debt, will be stricken off.-Laird v. Greensburg, 8 C. C. 621.
1"Dorrance v. Bristol, 224 Pa. 464.

56McLaughlin v. Summit Hill Borough, 224 Pa. 425; Evans v. Willistown Township, 168 Pa. 578.

51McKinnon v. Mertz, 225 Pa. 85; Brown v. City of Corry, 197 Pa. 41.
-"BloomsburgTownship Election Case, 18 C. C. 499.

'0Clough v. Shreve, 10 C. C. 398.
"°Bruce v. Pittsburg, 166 Pa. 152.
61Clark v. Luzerne Borough, 196 Pa. 210.
' 2Dorrance v. Bristol Borough, 224 Pa. 464.
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issue of bonds, 3 or the payment of a debt improperly contracted,64 or the collection of a tax for that purpose.'
RATIFICATION BY VOTE.

A debt may be created in excess of 2 per centum without a
vote of the people. It will be unenforceable against the municipality, because made in excess of the power of the council of city
or borough, of the school directors of a school district, of the
supervisors of a township, of the. commissioners of a county.
But their act is capable of validation by a subsequent ratification
by the voters. If the voters are asked to vote upon the issue of
bonds, to take up an earlier debt not in the form of bonds, or an
earlier issue of bonds, their assent to the issue wifl give validity
to it, and to the application of its proceeds to such earlier debt."
"As they" [the voters] ,says Stewart, P. J.,"could have authorized the debt in the first instance by giving their agents power to
contract it, they unquestionably have the right to affirm and
ratify it when contracted without their previous assent, by like
action on their part, as was required to give the power originally." 6
A mortgage in excess of 2 per cent, made without
authority of the electors, may be subsequently ratified by their
vote.'
CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT.

The invalidity of the debt, for whatever reason, should be
pleaded as a defence to the action for the recovery of it. A judgment, whether in the Common Pleas or before a justice of the
peace, against a township, etc., is conclusive of the soundness of
the debt. The debt cannot be attacked, collaterally. e. g., in an
application for a mandamus to compel the levy of a special tax,
from whose proceeds to pay the debt.
Where there are many
judgments, the mere fact that their aggregate exceeds 2 per
centum is not decisive that the debts were improperly contracted.
The debts may have originated before January 1, 1874; or they
6McLaughlin v. Summit Hill Borough, 224 Pa. 425; Sener v. Ephrata
Borough, 176 Pa. 80.
"Howard v. Olyphant Borough, 181 Pa. 191; O'Malley v. Olyphant,
198 Pa. 525.
"Wade v. Oakmont Borough, 165 Pa. 479.
"Roye v. Columbia Borough, 192 Pa. 146.
6'Bell v. Waynesborough, 195 Pa. 299; School District v. Lamprecht
Bros. Co., 198 Pa. 504.
'Stevenson v. School District, 6 Lack Jur. 264.
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may have had the approval of the electors; or the assessed valuation of the township may have been higher than it is now; or
the township may have sufferred a diminution of area."'
EFFECT OP VIOLATING THE STATUTE ON THE DEBT.

When a debt is contracted in violation of the constitution
and the statutes, it is void. There can be no recovery upon it,
even by a bonafde purchaser of it, although it is negotiable in
form,"' but if the debt, for which a bond has been issued, was
valid, although, the bond being invalid because improperly issued, there can be no recovery upon it, there may be a recovery
upon the debt." If debts have been gradually contracted, the
last without the vote of the people making the total debt more.
than 2 per centum, the part of the debt created, in excess of 2
per centum, will be void, and the rest valid; but if bonds are then
issued for the entire debt, there being nt vote of the electors,
the entire issue will be void, since it is impossible to distinguish
the sound from the unsound debt, which they represent." A
debt will be altogether void, if by any amount it exceeds, or,
added to the pre-existing debt, it causes that to exceed, 2 per
centum and it has not been authorized by a vote of the
people. A debt of a school district having, without popular vote,
been increased about $1000 beyond the two per centum, the court
refused to think that so slight an increase should be tolerated.
"We hold" said Edwards, P. J., "that once it is clearly shown
a school district has increased its indebtedness beyond the 'con69Plains

Township's Appeal, 21. Super. 68. In Lehigh Coal and Navi-

gation Co.'s Appeal, 112 Pa. 360, the court, it was said, could make an
order on the supervisors to levy a special tax for the payment of debts,
because the debts had been fixed by judgments of a justice of the peace
"and as the indebtedness does not appear to have exceeded the amount
allowed by the 8th section of the 9th article of the constitution." What,
if it had appeared?
70Millerstown v. Frederick, 114 Pa. 434; Mathews v. Scranton City, 7
Luz. Lg. Reg. 127. In Pike Co. v'. Rowland, 94 Pa. 238, a recovery on
the bond was allowed, the debt not having been increased beyond two
per centum.
71Rainsburg Borough v. Fyan, 127 Pa. 74. The money obtained for
void bonds belongs to the people who paid it. They can demand it in
equity and good conscience. Hence this money cannot as an asset be deducted from the gross debt, in determining the borrowing power; Luburg's Appeal 1. -Mona. 329.
72Millerstown v. Frederick, 114 Pa. 434.
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stitutional limitation, an injunction must be allowed.
Whether
the excess is $100 or $1000 or more, makes no difference." 3
NOT AN INCREASE OF DEBT.

The act of May 31, 1907, (P. L. 355,) authorizes cities and
boroughs to acquire water works heretofore owned by a private
corporation, a firm or an individual, at an appraisement. For the
purpose of making the purchase, the city, etc., may issue bonds,
"which shall be secured solely by such water works, system and
property, and the revenues thereof, to an amount not exceeding
the appraisement of the value fixed by the said appraisers or the
court. The proceeds of the sale of such bonds shall be used exclusively for the purpose of making payment for the property so
acquired." 74 Since the holders of the bonds must look exclusively to the water-works, it is doubtful whether the issue of
them increases the debt in the constitutional sense.75 Norristown
contracted with Andrew Carnegie to levy a tax which should
raise annually $5,000 for the support of a library, and he agreed
to pay the cost $50,000 of a library building. The act of June
28, 1895 (P. L. 411), authorizes boroughs and cities of the third
class to establish free libraries, and to impose a tax, not exceeding one mill upon the valuation, for that purpose. Edwards,
P. J., refused to discover in this contract an increase of indebtedness. To increase the tax is not to increase the debt. But was
there not a contract here to increase the tax? And, if that contract was broken, would not a debt to Andrew Carnegie arise in
the form of damages?" On July 19, 1900, an ordinance was
passed to issue bonds in order to provide a fund for the purchase
of land for municipal buildings, and for the purchase of fire apparatus. The bonds were not issued until October 23, 1900. On
July 12, 1900, an ordinance had been passed authorizing the construction of a sewer, and on August 25 the borough made the
contract for its construction. The debt created by the issue of
the bonds, October 23, 1900, cannot be considered as a debt existing when the sewer contract was made, although the ordinance
73

Dolan v, School District, 10 Dist. 694.
5.
Fleetwood Water Company v. Borough of Fleetwood, I Berks 69.
7
Sheetz v. School District, 17 Mont. 209. The court thinks that the
borough might be compelled by mandamus to levy from year to year
the increased tax. But, is not this necessity to levy increased tax the
very objection to the creation of debts?
4

1 Section
75
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authorizing it had already been passed, so as to require the creation of the sewer debt to be submitted to the people." If separate contracts are made with different persons, with A for lumber
to be used in a schoolhouse, with B for the bricks, with C for
the plastering, etc., and the contract made with A will not itself
increase the debt beyond 2 per centum, although the later contracts do, A's debt will be valid, although not submitted to the
voters, if he did not know that his contract was one of several,
to be made in the erection of the schoolhouse, and that the sum
of the debts arising from these contracts would exceed 2 per
centum. If A knew of the purpose to make the other contracts,
it would seem, says Rice, P. J., that he "ought to stand or fall
with the other creditors," knowing that the contract with him
"was part of an illegal transaction, although it standing alone,
might not constitute an illegal increase of the indebtedness.""8
FUNDING.

Bonds issued for the purpose of funding a floating debt, or
for the purpose of taking up outstanding bonds, if actually used
for these objects, are not an increase of the debt of the municipality but only a change of its form. Hence, bonds issued, since
Jan,1, 1874, when the present constitution went into operation, for
the purpose of extinguishing and actually used in extinguishing,
a debt originating before that date, are not to be considered, in
determining whether the city has, since that date, increased its
debt to 2 per centum of its valuation, so that a further increase
will require a vote of the people." A county' or other municipality may issue bonds for the funding of a floating debt; by so
doing it simply changes the form of the debt without increasing
it. The fact that some of the floating debt arose in 1894, some
in 1895, in 1896, and in 1897 and that considerable portion of the
7

Redding v. Esplen Borough, 207 Pa. 248.
School Districtv. Shortz, 2 Penn&. 231. If the various contracts are
made simultaneously, and the effect of all is to create a debt in excess of
2 per centum, they all would be void, Cf. Dolan v. School District; 10
Dist. 694.
"Hirt v. City of Erie, 200 Pa. 223. The city had issued bonds, since
Jan.1, 1874, to the amount of $1,344,200, but all of the sum, except $152,100. was issued in refunding bonds issued prior to 1874. Since $152,100
plus $70,000, the proposed increase, would not be 2 per cent of the valuation, the proposed increase did not need a vote of the people.
8"Snyder v. Kantner, 190 Pa. 440; Cf. Davis v. Braddock Borough,
48 Pitts. 145.
78
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taxes assessed those several years, are still, in 1896 uncollected,
will not induce the court to prevent the issue of bonds there being no evidence of the amount of the uncollected but still collectible taxes of these years, or the amount of floating debt arising
in each of them.
If the debt to be funded or refunded is itself invalid, because
though in excess of 2 per centum, it was not authorized by the
people, the funding or refunding would be invalid, unless so
authorized by the people, " but the authority of the people
would give validity to the bonds. 2
8'Millerstown v. Frederick, 114 Pa. 435; Cf. Cox v. Connellville
Borough, 22 C. C. 657.
82
Roye v. Columbia Borough, 192 Pa. 146; School District v. Lamprecht Bros. Co., 198 Pa. 504.
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MOOT COURT
COMMONWEALTH V. TREAT
Use at Trial, of Admissions of Counsel at Hearing before Justice
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Treat, being on trial for forgery, the Commonwealth, in order to show
that he executed the forgery, offered proof that at the hearing before
the justice, Treat's counsel admitted that he executed the document, for
the purpose of avoiding a continuance of the hearing until the Commonwealth could command the witness on whom it relied to prove the execution. The evidence was admitted, and Treat was found guilty. Motion

for a new trial.
MORGAN, for Commonwealth.
REICHELDERFER, for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
COOK, J.-Admissions in the law of evidence have been defined as
being concessions or voluntary acknowledgments made by a party of the
existence of certain facts and have been said to be direct, or express,
implied or indirect or incidental, and either judicial or extra-judcial.-16 Cyc. 938.
This was, we think, a judicial admission.
Judicial admissions are those made in court by a party's attorney
and generally appear either of record as in pleading or in the solemn admission of the attorney made for the purpose of being used as a substitute
for the regular legal evidence of the fact at trial, or in a case stated for
the opinion of the court.-Greenleaf, p. 205.
Judicial admissions are frequently those of counsel or attorneys of
record. When these are made in good faith by counsel in his professional
capacity for the purpose of dispensing with the evidence and to that end
are distinct and formal, they bind the client whether made before, in or
after the trial.
It is considered that the original concession may well have been made
for other reasons than because it states the fact truly, for example, to
save time, or to avoid a continuance.-16 Cyc. 965. The attorney is acting in capacity of an agent for his client.
Where one has been authorized to act as the agent of another, his
declarations and representations made in rblation to and in connection
with, the business of his agency, and while employed therein and within
the scope of his authority in relation thereto are admissible as evidence
to bind his principal.-P. and L. Vol. 6 Col. 9634.
According to the authority above cited that the prisoner is bound by
judicial admissions made by his counsel though they may afterwards be
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used as evidence against him, we think there was no error in admitting the
evidence. In this case the evidence was judicial notice and used simply for
the purpose of having a continuance.
On the further principle that admissions of an agent bind his principal
since the relation of attorney and client is in fact that of principal and
agent, there is a double ground for admitting this evidence.
We therefore direct the motion for a new trial to be stricken off.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
The commonwealth would have been obliged to ask for an adjournment of the hearing before the justice, in order to be able to command
the presence of a witness, had the defendant's counsel not admitted the
fact to be proved by this witness, namely the defendant's execution of
the document. By this admission the commonwealth procured the commitment of the defendant for trial, the object of the hearing. Not content with the accomplishment of this object, it now, at the trial, strives
to use the admission again,-no longer to put the defendant on trial, but
to convict him at the trial. So far as appears, it has had time and opportunity to secure the presence of the witness whose absence at the hearing induced the making of the admission.
The defendant may have been willing to concede as a fact the truth
of an allegation, for the purpose of expediting the preliminary hearing
which should issue in his being remitted to a trial by jury without being
willing to concede the truth of this allegation before the jury itself.
It cannot be said that the commonwealth has been misled into omitting to obtain other evidence of the defendant's execution of the document, and that, for this reason, it should be allowed to use the admission
made at the hearing. The commonwealth should have known that the
admission made would not be receivable without the consent of the de
fendant. It should before the trial at least have obtained the explicit consent of the defendant to its use of the admission. There would then be
some plausible ground for alleging that the prisoner had estopped himself
from objecting to the reception of his admission.
That an admission of a fact may be made without impliedly asserting that the fact occurred, is evident. Denial, under the circumstances,
may be useless. The advantage to be gained by denial may not compensate for the attendant disadvantages. The prisoner may think it less
irksome to allow the committing magistrate to assume that he executed
a document, and instantly dispose of the case, than to compel himself to
appear again at a postponed hearing, as he will if he refuses to admit
the execution.
It may be said that the admission should be received as evidence, and
that the jury should be allowed to decide what weight should be attached
to it, their attention being called to the infirmative considerations. That
view is not wholly illogical. We think it safer, however, to exclude the
evidence altogether, and to compel the prosecution to furnish the evidence on which it would have been compelled to rely, had the provisional
admission not been made.
It is not prudent to extend the range of cases in which statements of
counsel, in criminal cases, shall affect the prisoner. The counsel may
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have made the admission without consultation with his client, on his own
view of the wisdom of terminating promptly the preliminary investigations. The client may not have realized the later uses to which the prosecution would seek to apply the admission. Indeed the attorney may not
have done so.
In Rex v. Thornhill, 8 Car. & P. 575, Abinger, C. B., declined to allow
an agreement between attorneys, made before the trial, that formal
proof should be dispensed with by the crown, to be used. saying that the
admissible admission must be made "at the trial" by the defendant or
his counsel. In Weisbrod v. R. R. Co., 20 Wisc. 421, admissions at a
former trial were excluded. Cf. also, Harden v. Forsythe, 99 Ill. 312;
Cutler v.Cutler, 130 N. C. 1, 40 S. E. 689. In State v. Butler, 151 N.
C. 672, 65 S. E. 993. an admission at the preliminary hearing to prevent
a continuance, was not allowed to be heard at the trial. Cf. State v.
Bryant, 93 Mo. 273. In Padgitt v. Moll, 159 Mo. 143, 60 S. W. 121, a
statute provided that if the opposite party will admit what an absent
witness would swear to, as set out in an affidavit that he would swear
thus and thus, the case shall not be continued, but the party moving for
the continuance may read the affidavit as evidence. It was held, however, to be error to allow the use of this affidavit at a trial later than
that contemplated, when the continuance was asked for. "The adihission, under such circumstances, does not stand for all time, but ceases
when the emergency ceases." In Ryan v. Beard's Heirs, 74 Ala. 306, it
is said such an admission [that the absent witness would swear so and
so] "is not an admission of his competency nor of the relevancy of the
facts as evidence, nor is it admissible for any purpose on a trial at a subsequent term, although the witness has since died."
It was error, therefore, in the trial court, to allow the commonwealth
to employ the admission of the defendant, made at the preliminary hearing, as evidence that he executed the document of whose forgery he is
accused.
Judgment reversed with v. f. d. n.

COMMONWEALTH V. PAYNE
Homicide.

Killing to Prevent the Victim's Killing.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Payne attacked Peppard with the intention of killing him. During
the strugle which ensued Payne repented of his intention to kill, but the
fight was so fierce that he could not retreat, and had no means whereby
to convey to Peppard the fact that he had relinquished his intent.
Payne's brother came along and thinking that his brother was in serious
danger shot and killed Peppard in order to save his brother's life.
MENDELSOHN, for Commonwealth.
RoOKE, for defendant.
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OPINION OF THE COURT.

PUDERBAUGH, J. There are two questions presented to the
court in this case. First, whether the aggressor in an affray may after
forming the intention to kill, withdraw that intention, and without any
outward sign or action to convey such intention to the other party and
then kill his opponent in defence of his own life? In answer to this
We say that he cannot.
When one who has provoked a combat abandons or withdraws from
same in good faith, and not merely for the purpose of gaining an advantage,
and by his conduct clearly shows his desire to decline any further struggle
his right of self-defence is restored, and he is justified in killing his adversary, to save himself from death or great bodily harm. But the aggressor's mere willingness to withdraw is not sufficient ; he must both
endeavor to really and in good faith withdraw from the combat and must
also in some manner make known his intention to his adversary. If the
circumstances are such that he cannot notify his adversary it is the assailant's fault and he must take the consequences. -21 Cyc. 810, (and cases
there under cited).
So, if Payne had killed the deceased, it is very clear that he would
have been guilty of murder evien though he had in good faith withdrawn
his intent.
The second question presented is: The prisoner having come upon
the scene and,not knowing the situation of either party, and seeing that his
qrother was in grave danger of losing his life, having shot and killed the
man whom his brother had first attacked, is he also guilty of murder?
Blackstone in his Commentaries, 4 Blackstone, 186 says. "Under excuse of self defence the principal civil and natural relations are comprehended; therefore master and servant, parent and child, husband and
wife, killing an assailant in necessary defense of each other respectively
are excused; the act of relation being construed the same as the act of
the party himself."
"The general doctrine in this class of cases is, that whatever one
may do for himself he may do for another. The comrixon case is where
a father, son, brother, husband, servant or the like protects by his arm
the feeble. Though distinction and doubts have been taken, the better
view plainly is that we may do for another whatever the other may do
for himself."-Bishop's Criminal Law, 665.
"The right to defend another, however, can be no greater than the
right of another to defend himself; so that if a person brings in a difficulty,
so that he could not, if he killed his opponent set up the plea of self-defense, his brother, if he kills him cannot set up the same plea." -Clark
Criminal Law, p. 186.
A person may also be justified or excused in killing in defense of his
or her parent, husband and wife, child, or brother and sister. The rule
also permits one to kill in self-defense of his master or servant; or even
to prevent the commission of a felony by violence or surprise upon a
stranger, always provided the circumstances are such that the person
defended would be justified or excused in killing in his own defense.
To justify or excuse a homicide in defense-of another it must at
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least be reasonably apparent to the slayer that the person defended is in
imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, and that it is necessary
for him to use the means or force which results in death in order to prevent them. And although it has been held that if the defender has a good
motive or intention, it is immaterial that the person is not altogether
blameless; but by the weight it is necessary that neither the person nor
defender shall be at fault in bringing in difficulty or that if he has provoked the attack he shall in good faith withdraw before the killing.-21
Cyc. 826, 827, 829.
Although there are some cases contra, the preponderance of authority is such as will warrant a conviction.
Since Payne the aggressor would have been guilty of murder had he
killed the deceased in defense of his life his brother is placed in the
same position by his killing of the deceased.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.
John Payne assaulted Peppard with a murderous intent, but changed
his purpose. Peppard not knowing of this changed purpose, continued to
press Payne in a manner which boded death to Payne, but which was
warranted by Peppard's reasonable apprehension of death from Payne, if
he did not so press Payne. Had Peppard killed Payne, the homicide
would have been innocent.
William Payne came on the scene, and, witnessing the combat, could
reasonably infer that Peppard was about feloniously to kill John, and
that a severe corporal injury to Peppard, probably a fatal injury, could
alone prevent his killing John.
We take the law to be that anybody, bonafide believing "that a violent felony is in the process of commission, which can only be arrested by
the death of the supposed felon" commits an excusable homicide when he
kills the supposed felon.-1 Wharton Crim. Law, p. 473; Cf. I Bishop
Crim. Law, 511; 1 McClain Crim. Law, 266.
To the suggestion that the felony must in fact be in process of perpetration, the observations of Wharton are a pertinent reply: "We may
correctly accept, in this as well as in the analogous case of self-defense,
the position that if A, honestly and without negligence on his part, believes that B is in the process of committing a violent felony which can
only be arrested by B's death, A is excused in killing B."
The learned court below has considered the case as one of self-defense on the part of John Payne, and has applied the principle that what
John could legally do, in defending himself, his-brother William could do,
but that when the facts deprive John of the right to defend himself, at
the expense of the life of Peppard, they will deprive his brother William
of the right to defend him, by killing Peppard.-21 Cyc. 826, 828; Sherrill
v. State, 138 Ala. 3, 35 So. 129; Bostie v. State, 94 Ala. 45; Cain's
Case, 20 W. Va. 679; State v. Greer, 22 W. Va. 800 (apparently not
disapproved in Snurr v. State, 4. N. E. 445.) In Crockett v. Commonwealth, 38 S.W. 674 (Ky.), it is held that a brother is guilty who kills
the assailant of his brother, if the assailed brother "had sought and
brought on the difficulty in which the killing was done." This view is
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accepted by McClain, 1 Grim. Law, 285; Clark, Grim. Law, 186; 1 Wharton, Grim. Law, 471. It is asking much of a brother, A, who sees his
brother, B, about to be killed by X, to ask him to refrain from assisting
B by disabling, by killing X, if B, the imperiled brother, has put himself
into the predicament by his own unlawful act, and he, A, knows that B
has done so. The ordinary brother will rush to the defense of his brother
from death, by whatever improper acts he may have exposed himself to
it. Some concession ought to be made to this affecting and noble trait of
human nature, and to hold the rescuing brother guilty of malicious killing
when he kills merely to save the life of his brother, would be unnecessary
harshness.
It would be barbarous to hold that when A, honestly thinking his
brother B, without fault on his part, assaulted by X with intent to kill
him, interposes and kills X, he is liable as a murderer, if in fact B's
fault had put him in peril from X's attack.
We think that if Wm. Payne not unreasonably thought Peppard the
assailant, and his brother innocent of wrong, he should be acquitted of
any crime. If he knew even that John had provoked the assault, by
murderously assailing Peppard, and interposed, not to promote John's
object of slaying Peppard, but to rescue John from a self-produced peril,
being actuated by affection for his brother, and not by anger, revenge,
hate, retaliation, or other improper feeling towards Peppard, he ought to
be guilty of nothing more than voluntary homicide. The poignant horror
at the impending death of a brother ought to be deemed sufficient "provocation" for the act to make it non-malicious. Although anger is the
passion which the provocation usually elicits, which leads to the act called voluntary manslaughter, "yet any other passion, as sudden resentment, or terror, rendering the mind incapable of cool reflection, may reduce the grade of the crime" of homicide (21 Cyc. 737); and a violent
attack on a friend or relative in the presence of A may so excite A as to
make a lethal attack by him on the assailant non-malicious (Cyc. 750).
Had John Payne been killed by Peppard in sight of William, and had
William thereupon in horror and indignation killed Peppard, he would
have been guilty only of voluntary manslaughter (1 Wharton Grim. Law,
p. 446). Why should he be guilty of more, if he killed Peppard, not for
an irreparable killing of his brother, but for the purpose of preventing
the killing of his brother?
Doubtless, A ought to let X kill his brother B, if that is necessary to
save him (X) from being killed by B, but humo.n nature cannot be expected to do everything that it ought to do, and a state would be savagely
sanguinary that would put A to death, because, seeing the death of his
brother, B, or of X necessary, he intervened to cause the death of X.
Extenuation of his conduct would not be possible, of course, if he
had contrived the necessity of the alternative death of B or X. The case
before the court below was not such. John Payne had no share in prodicing the situation. He found the alternative already made for him of
X killing his brother or of his killing X. He must not be too severely
punished because, in such an emergency. he yielded to the impulses of
brotherly affection, and sent to Hades the man who was about to become
-however innocently-his brother's slayer.
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In conclusion, the jury should have been told to acquit the defendant
if they found that Peppard was about to kill his brother and that without negligence he believed that the killing would be a felony, and to acquit of any homicide above manslaughter, if they found that Peppard
was even negligently convinced that Peppard's killing would be felonious;
or even if he knew that under the circumstances, Peppard's killing his
brother would have been justifiable, if the defendant's act was done suddenly, and from the mere desire to save his brother's life.

COMMONWEALTH V. ALLEN
Homicide.-Duty to Retreat.-KMifing to Prevent Killing.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
James and John Allen were brothers. They lived at the house of
their father Thomas Allen. On Jan. 1, 1910, John, without provocation,
made an assault upon James under such circumstances as to justify James
in believing that John intended to kill himo. The assault was committed
within the house of Thomas Allen and James could have avoided all danger by retreating from the house. He did not, but remained in the house
and killed his brother in order to prevent his brother from killing him.
WATKINS, for Commonwealth.
O'BRIEN, for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
BADGER, J. The question here is whether the circumstances were
such as to justify James' killing his brother, or was he bound to retreat.
We are of the opinion that the rule as regards the defense of the home
has no application in this case and can be dismissed, for in Commonwealth
v. Johnson, 213 Pa. 432, where the house was the property of the prisoner's wife, who was also the mother of the deceased, and both were members of the family, with the right to be in the house, the prisoner was
charged with murder of deceased, and it was there held that the ordinary
rules as to self-defense were alone applicable, and that the rights of a
This leaves us
householder against a violent intruder had no relevancy.
confronted with the two propositions, (1) as regards the ordinary rules of
self-defense, and (2) as to the ingredients of the degrees of murder.
To justify a killing in self-defense there must be a reasonable belief
that there is no other means of escape from death or great bodily harm.
(Com. v. Johnson, 213 Pa. 432.) Thu belief that there will be a little
more danger by retreat is not a sufficient justification, nor is the belief
that the attack will occasion a mere scratch or some slight personal injury
And as long as there is a possible
(Com. v. Breyessee, 160 Pa. 451).
means of escape, it must be taken advantage of (Logue v. Com., 38
Pa. 265); for to excuse a homicide by plea of self-defense, it must appear
that the slayer had no other, or at least probable, means of escaping, and
that his act was one of necessity (Com. v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9). The law is
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well settled that a man may not kill another in self-defence if he have
other probable means of escape (Com. v. Ware, 137 Pa. 465).
The fact
that the prisoner in the case at bar had ample opportunity to retreat and
thereby avoid all danger is unquestioned. His plea of self-defense has,
therefore, not entitled him to an acquital, since perhaps the most essential element to its maintainance is wanting. This brings us to the
question as to the extent of his crime; is it murder in first or second
degree, or is it simply manslaughter? All homicide is presumed to be
murder until the contrary appears in the evidence; and the burden of reducing it to manslaughter is on the accused. But such presumption
is no higher than that the homicide is murder in second degree; and it
lies on the Commonwealth to establish the facts and circumstances which
constitute murder in first degree (Com. v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9). Malicious
causation of death is murder. Non-malicious causation of death is manslaughter. Of murder there are two sub-classes, murder of 1st and
murder of second degree. Malice is the common quality of both of these
degrees, and its presence or absence determines whether the criminal
homicide is murder or manslaughter (Vol II Trickett Grim. Law 766).
Murder which shall be perpetrated by means of lying in wait, or by any
other kind of willful and premeditated killing, or which shall be committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any arson, rape,
robbery or burglary shall be deemed murder of first degree, and all other
kinds of murder shall be deemed murder of second degree (Act March 31,
1860, Sec. 74, P. L. 402).
Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of another without malice, either express or implied, which may be voluntarily
upon a sudden heat, or involuntarily, but in the commission of some unlawful act (4 Blackstone's Com. 191). In determining whether a homicide
is of second degree it is necessary to discover that there was malice, and
that there' was no intention to kill; and that the killing did not result
from the perpetration of any of the four felonies (Vol. II Trickett Grim.
Law 818). Express malice is said to be personal illwill and hatred or
enmity towards the party killed (Brown v. Com. 76 Pa. 319). Implied
malice is where there is no specific intent to kill, but one is possessed of a depraved heart, a wicked devilish disposition, regardless of
all social duty and indifferent in his intercourse with others, whether he
injures them' or not (Com. v. Platt 11 Phila. 415). In Com. v. Drum' 58
Pa. 9, we find the following explanations of the terms used in defining first
degree murder:-'"In murder if an intention to kill exists, it is wilful; if
the intention be accompanied by such circumstances as evidence a mind
fully conscious of its own purpose and design, it is deliberate,-and if
sufficient time be afforded to enable the mind fully to frame the design to
kill and to select the instrument or to frame the plan to carry this design
into execution, it is premeditated." The facts of the present case will
not permit its falling within these boundaries as laid down to constitute
murder in the first degree-the fully-formed purpose to kill is absent, and
there is not that necessary time for deliberatit n and premeditation "which
will convince the jury that this purpose is not the immediate offspring of
rashness and impetuous temper, and that the mind has become fully conscious of its own design" (Com. v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9). The fact that a man
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kills another upon a sudden attack repudiates the idea of deliberation and
premeditation-even though the act be accompanied with malice, it lacks
a fully formed purpose to take life. Pistoriusv. Com., 84 Pa. 158, held that
where the deceased approached prisoner in a threatening manner, so that
the latter had a reasonable belief that he was in danger of bodily harm,
and acting on that belief and apprehension of danger, fired a pistol shot
and killed deceased, the crime was not murder in 1st degree, although
the prisoner fired with intent to kill, and there was no occasion to take
life in order to save his own or to avert great bodily harm.
To reduce an intentional blow, resulting in death, to manslaughter,
there must be sufficient cause of provocation, and a state of rage or passion without time to cool, placing the person beyond the control of his
reason and suddenly impelling him to the deed ( Com. v. Drum, 58 Pa.
9). We believe that the attack in this case was not such aprovocation
as would throw the prisoner into such a state of passion as would justify
his losing control of his reason. It has been held that the fact that a
prisoner on trial for murder drew a pistol and fired a fatal shot upon the
sudden impulse of an attack upon him and of blows received, and in consequence of rage thereby caused, was not sufficient to reduce the offense
to manslaughter (Com. v. Ware, 137 Pa. 465). The prisoner at bar cannot be held for first degree murder or for manslaughter. But the elements of his crime bring it within the limits of second degree murderit was not committed while in the perpetration of any of the four felonies,
and that there was malice is shown by the fact that theprisoner, although
he could have retreated and thus avoided all danger, chose rather to
stand his ground and fire the shot which might or might not cause
death.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.
The defendant claims that he was under no duty to retreat before
killing his brother because (1) a man is not bound to retreat from his
house; (2) the assault of his brotherwas madewith murderous intent, and
he was without fault himself.
That a man need not retreat from his own house, is admitted by the
commonwealth to be a settled rule as between one who is the exclusive
owner and an aggressor who has no right of entrance, but its application
is denied as between those who have equal rights to be in the house. An
examination of the history of the origin of the rule and of its development
discloses facts which tend to support the contention of the commonwealth. - (Bishop's Crim. Law. 653.) But why, it may be inquired, should
one retreat from his own house when assaulted by his co-tenant any more
than when assailed by a stranger? Whither shall he flee, and how far,
and when may he be permitted to return? He has a lawful right to be
and remain in his house, and the legal nature and value of that right is
not abrogated by its enjoyment in connection with another. Reasoning
of this character impressed the court in Jones v. St. 76 Ala. 8, where it is
held that the principle that a man need not retreat from his house applies as between partners, joint tenants and tenants in common. And in
Wharton on Homicide, 492, it is said, " So a person in his own home has

128

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

the same right to stand his ground and kill in self defense when assalulted
by a partner or co-tenant as when assaulted bya stranger." See alsoDe
Forest v. St., 21 Ind. 23.
The decision of the court below upon this point is, however, sufficiently justified by the Pennsylvania case cited, which is directly in point.
It is clear, under the authorities at common law, that when a person,
being without fault, is murderously assaulted, he may stand his ground
and slay his assailant (1 Hale P. C. 40, 1 East P. C.271, Foster C. L.
273, Beale 326, Anon., Fitzh. Abr., Corone Pl. 284, Mikell 411). And
this view is supported by the decisions of the courts of many states.
See cases collected 25 A. and E. 272.
Other courts have refused to follow this rule and have held that the
person assaulted must retreat in all cases, if he can safely do so, though the
attack upon him may befelonious, and though he may himself be free from
fault (25 A. and E. 272). This is the law of Pennsylvania (Trickett's
Crim. Law 698, and cases cited).
It follows from these principles that the defendant's act in killing his
brotherwas not justifiable or excusable, and, as the killing was intentional,
the defendant committed murder in the first degree, or murder in the
second degree, orvoluntary manslaughter. Whether the evidence was sufficient to warrant a conviction of murder in the first degree, need not be
discussed for a conviction for murder in the second degree on an indictment for murder is a bar to a subsequent prosecution for murder in the
first degree (Com. v. Winters, 18 Phila. 667; Sadler Crim. Proc. 333; Com.
v. Gabor 209 Pa. 201).
To reduce an intentional killing to voluntary manslaughter there must
be both provocation and passion (Trickett's Crim. Law 856, and
cases cited). The question whether certain facts are sufficient provocation to reduce a homicide from murder to manslaughter is one of law for
the court (Lynch v. Com. 77 Pa. 221; Com. v. Paise, 220 Pa. 371; Pa. v.
Bell Add 156).
As a general rule an assault without a battery is not regarded by the
law as a sufficient provocation to arouse such a degree of passion as will
reduce an intentional killing to manslaughter (25 A. and E. 182; Small v.
Com., 91 Pa. 304). Butif the assaultwas of such a nature as to evince an
intent to inflict severe bodily injury it is a sufficient provocation (25 A. and
1E. -82; Penna. v. Bell Add 162; Trickett Crim. Law, 864). And it has been
AM# that it is not always necessary that a blow shall have actually been
st~pk and that it is sufficient if the deceased was evidently about to strike
the defendant (21 Cyc. 747). The learned court below was wrong in
holding that the provocation was not adequate.
Even though the provocation was adequate the killing is not reduced to
voluntary manslaughter unless it excited passion (Trickett's Crim. Law
868). The burden isupon the prisoner, if the commonwealth has not proved it, to prove the existence of the passion.-Penna. v. Bell, Add. 156;
Weston v. Com. 111 Pa. 251; Com.v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9.
In the present case there was no evidence tending to prove passion.
The judgment of the learned court below must, therefore, be affirmed.
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COMMONWEALTH V. SLOAN.
Larceny-Silence of Accused on Hearing Accusing Remark of

Wife.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Sloan is tried for the theft of a hammer and other tools-six in number. They were found at his house three days after the theft. When
the prosecutor visited the home, in searching for the stolen articles,
Sloan's wife said that he had brought them the day before. Sloan, who
was 20 feet away, but could have heard the statement, did not say anything. These facts were the only evidence of Sloan's guilt. He was
convicted. Motion for new trial.
REDDING, for Commonwealth.
SAVIDGE, for defendant.

OPINION OF THE COURT.
LOKUTA, J.-Counsel for the motion contends that the statement
made by defendant's wife in his presence as to the goods having been
brought into the house a day before the finding of them by plaintiff, in possession of defendant, in his home, was as evidence against the defendant,
evidence by a wife against her husband, not coming within the exceptions, and therefore not admissible as coming under the act of 1887, and
this being true that upon this admission of evidence, there is ground for
a new trial.
It is true, that the more recent the finding of stolen property in possession of a person after the theft of the property is, the stronger is the
evidence of the person being the thief. This is sustained by authority
given below. And then the evidence would show that the stolen goods
were in possession of defendant two days after the theft instead of three
days after, and thus it would be evidence by the wife against her husband. But we do not think that that alone is sufficient to sustain a motion
for a new trial, although in connection with other evidence it may.
Another question arises, as we imagine, in this case; that is,
'Whether the evidence given in the case is sufficient to sustain the charge
made against the defendant." If not, then a new trial should be granted.
Taking of the articles by the accused may be inferred from circumstances; e. g., from his possession shortly after the theft, and his not
giving a satisfactory account of manner in which, consistent with his
innocence, he obtained it. If he gives an account jury must decide upon

its credibility (Trickett's Crim. Law, Vol. 1, p. 132; 118 Pa. 77). Possession must be shortly after the theft in order to justify a conviction of
the theft from possession alone.
Com- v. Berney, 28 Super. 61 holds "That after 60 days an inference
of larceny does not necessarily arise (that is, 60 days after theft was
committed, the goods were found in defendant's possession, but here it
was only three days after the theft). In order to convict a person of
larceny because of possession of stolen property, it must be made to
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appear that possession was recent. The law does not declare what this
period is; much depends upon the character of property and circumstances
of the case. This was surely covered in the present case.
If goods which had been recently stolen were found in his (defendant's)
possession (personal and exclusive), and he knew that he had possession, that
was evidence which it was proper for the jury to consider with all evidence in the case, in passing upon the guilt of defendant (10 Superior 657).
Possession of part of stolen property is evidence of theft of the whole (25
Cyc. 132).
When a person is found in possession of stolen property, it is usually
held that the burden of accounting for such possession rests upon him, as
it is commonly put, that the possession of itself raises a presumption
against the accused which will justify a conviction if he does not meet it
by a reasonable explanation (25 Cyc. 133).
Possession of stolen goods is primafacie evidence that the possessor
is the thief and throws upon him the necessity of accounting for his possession (9 Conn. 527; 102 Mass. 163).
, 138 Mass. 182, pigeons were stolen. "Two
In Corn. v. -weeks" later they were found in possession of defendant, who said he
bought them two weeks ago. Defendant asked the court to rule thatthere
was no evidence to be submitted to jury; that possession of pigeons by
defendant was not evidence that they were stolen, or stolen by him, and
that possession by defendant was not sufficiently recent to justify the
application of the rule as to recent possession of stolen property. Court
refused to so rule, and instructed the jury as to effect of recent possession by defendant of property, if stolen. That possession not being
accounted for was primafacie evidence of guilt. The Supreme Court said:
That there was evidence that the pigeons were stolen by some person and
possession by defendant was sufficiently recent to be evidence that he
was the person who stole them unless it was satisfactorily explained.
People v. Weldon, 111 N. Y. 569, holds.that there is no question but
that recent possession of stolen property by a person raises a presumption of guilt which maybe considered by the jury and in the absence of explanation-by such person, authorizes it to infer a criminal connection
with its eloignment. The presumption grows weaker as the time of
possession recedes from the time of the original taking, but the fact itself
is one for the consideration of the jury, under all the circumstances of the
case (43 N. Y. 179; Knickerbocker v. People).
In almost all jurisdictions possession unexplained justifies a conviction. 25 Cyc. 136, 18 Pa. Super. 431, holds that possession of defendant
must be personal and exclusive for the reason that such possession alone
indicates that the goods have come to possessor by his own act or with
his consent (151 N. Y. 493). Whether possession is recent enough is for
the jury to decide (25 Cyc. 138). This is clearly found in the case before
us; the possession was personal, being in his house, and the jury when
deciding must have found it so.
Possession of fruits of crime recently after its commission is prima
.facie evidence of guilty possession, and if unexplained by direct evidence
or by attending circumstances, or by the character and habits of life of
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the possessor, or otherwise, it is taken as conclusive (Greenleaf on Evidence, p. 129, 16th edition).
From the above authorities we must conclude that there was sufficient
evidence to put the case to the jury. The possession is sufficiently recent, the goods foun I in defendant's possession. What else could commonwealthprove? They did about all they could. -ItWasuponthedefendant
to explain his possession of the goods. He could more easily prove where
he got the goods, whether he bought them or they were brought to him
by some one, than the commonwealth could prove that he did not buy
them or that they were not brought into defendant's home by another
and that defendant was innocent. Commonwealth has made out a prima
facie case. It would be a great aid for criminals, in committing
larceny, to allow them to steal the property, hold it in possession,
say nothing, and if the commonwealth did not produce direct evidence of
the theft then to let them free. It is better to force the thief to explain, h w, when and where he got the goods that are in his possession,
and recently stolen. We do not think the fact that defendant stood 20
feet from his wife when she made the statement concerning the bringing in
of the goods is of much, if any, importance, and if so it would be against
the defendant and not in his favor.
We must conclude that there was sufficient evidence to let the case
go to the jury.
New trial refused.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.
The learned court below seems to have been of the opinion that the
evidence concerning the statement of the wife, though inadmissible, was
of such slight probative force that the defendant could not have been
prejudiced thereby. In this opinion we cannot concur. If the fact that
the goods were found at the house of the defendant a short time after
the theft tends to show that he stole them, surely ihe fact that they were
in his house because he brought them there is a matter of considerable significance and probative value; and if the evidence of this fact was improperly admitted, a new trial should have been granted.
The contention of the counsel for the defendant is that to admit evidence concerning the statement of the wife would be to allow a wife to
testify against her husband.
This view finds pupport in State v. Richardson, 141, Mo. 326, where it is said: "Where the wife is incompetent
to testify against her husband, the testimony of a third person as to her
declarations in the presence of her husband are not admissible against
him" She was incompetent as a witness to testify to such a statement
so made, and it necessarily follows that if she could not ma e it as a witness she could not make it to a third person and have him repeat it and
thereby violate one of the fundamental rules applicable to the competency of witnesses; that is, that it is incompetent for a wife to testify
against her husband.
The view of the MissQuri court and of the learned counsel for the defePse is due to the misapprehension of the nature Qf the evidence offered. The evidence of tho statement of the wife is not offered as of
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itself evidence of the truth of the facts stated, but simply to show that
the conduct of the husband at the time of the making of the statement
was such as to indicate his guilt. It has therefore been held that evidence of such statements is admissible. "It makes no difference that
the statements which call for a reply were made by a party who is in.competent to testify" (2 Enc. L. & P. 41; Abbott Crim. Trial Brief, p.
214). This rule was applied where the statement was made by the wife
in the following cases: P. v. Bartlett, 7 Car. &P., 832; R. v. Smith, 5
C. & P. 832; Garett v. S., 76 Ala. 18; S. v. Middleham, 62 Iowa 150; Com.
v. Lunai, 148 Mass. 70. In S. v. Record, 151 N. C. 695, it is held that
upon the trial of one for larceny declarations of his wife made
in his presence to the effect that the stolen property found in the house
belonged to the husband are admissible.
In this case the statement of the wife was made within 20 feet of
the husband and he "could have heard it." Whether he did hear it was
a question for the jury (2 Enc. L. & P. 37).
The learned court below correctly held that the evidence presented
was sufficient to warrant a conviction.

BOOK REVIEWS.
A Digest of the Laws of Pennsylvania, from 1700 to 1907,
by GEORGE WHARTON PEPPER and WILLIAm DRAPER LEwis.
Second edition. In four volumes. T. & J. W. Johnson Co.,
Philadelphia.
For several years the profession has been anxiously awaiting
the appearance of this edition of Pepper and Lewis' Digest. The
first edition was a great improvement upon the Purdon then in
use. Its annotations were much more nearly complete. The
various mechanical features of the book commended it especially.
The type was large and clear, a property of which its rival could
not be accused. The broad page was divided into two columns,
a feature of which only experience enables us to realize the value.
The annotations, instead of being thrown to the foot of the page,
followed the annotated paragraph, so that the eye readily caught
it, not having to drop to the bottom of the page, nor to pick it
out from a large mass of notes in very small type. These and
other more important qualities of the work made its obsolescence
a matter of regret, and a new edition was eagerly longed for. It
has at length arrived, and we most heartily congratulate the
lawyers of the state upon its appearance.
The notes, always an important feature of a statute digest,

are not intended to express the common law of a given subject,
but simply the decisions upon the statute law, thus avoiding the
error of excessive and irrelevant annotation. The lawyerdoesnot
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expect to find, in his statutory code, anything else than statutes
and the cases in which these statutes have undergone interpretation. At the end of the notes, if other cases than those mentioned therein exist, the appropriate place in Pepper & Lewis'
Digest of Decisions is referred to. Almost all lawyers have
ready access to this Digest, and when the column therein is
named where the cases may be found, useless duplication is
avoided by citing the exact place.
Titles have been made as numerous as possible, and since
the articles under them are arranged alphabetically, it is easy to
find quickly what the searcher is pursuing. Careful attention
has been. given to cross-references, so that the possible headings
under which the matter which is looked for may be found; if not
found in the article being examined may be discovered
elsewhere.
A very valuable feature of the work is that it gives, at the
head of each article, a list of section headings, and a complete
table of all the general acts bearing upon the subject. Repealed
acts are indicated, as well as those which have become obsolete,
because repealed, or pronounced unconstitutional.
Possibly the most important new feature of the work is the
chronological table of acts, in the fourth volume. Each act is
treated section by section and specific information given relating
-to each section. "By means of this list," say the editors, "any
one using the Digest may ascertain at once whether or not any
given section of a general act is in force, and if not in force, or
amended, by what act it was repealed, superseded or amended."
The amending act is atso found in the list with information as to
whether it is in force or not.
This table of acts indicates where, in the digest, each particular section of it may be found. The experience of the writer
has been that the absence of such reference causes, in the search
for a given section of an act, an immense loss of time. A table
of cases is found in the fourth volume, with reference to the paragraph and title where each is cited.
Special attention has been paid to the preparation of the index. The books are handsomely printed and very pleasingly
bound in law buckram.
The mechanical features of the first edition, to which reference is made at the beginning of this notice, are repeated in the
new edition: clear, large type; double columns; notes immediately following the sections; bold, black-faced type at the beginning of every section, indicating its topic. The volumes are
handsome examples of the typographer's art, and the binding is
chaste, beautiful and durable. In a word, the work is admirable
and to the legal investigator indispensable. Editors and publishers deserve alike the gratitude of the profession for it.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
Ethical Obligations of the Lawyer, by GLIASON L. ARCHER,

LL. B., Dean of the Suffolk School of Law,
Co., Boston, 1910.

Little, Brown &

We have found this a very readable book of over 360 pages.
It utidertakes to state the obligations of the lawyer to society,
to his client, to the courts, to other lawyers, and this task it does
not only very entertainingly, but very seriously. The small,
not less than the large duties of the lawyer, are mentioned. He
"should maintain a neat and well-groomed appearance." He
should impress the visitants of his office with his erudition, by
"arranging what books he has in the most imposing array possible," and as "law books are all alike to the ordinary client,"
the lawyer need not be particular as to what books he puts on
his shelves, so that they seem to the unlearned to be law books.
A suggestion much needed in small towns is that the "lawv office
should not be a lounging place for the attorney's idle friends and
acquaintances." The book is not too idealistic. Although,
theoretically, "all clients should stand on exactly the same
basis," yet in this "practical world" the lawyer will naturally
devote more attention and vigilance to the legitimate claims of a
client who can pay handsomely than he will to the service of
an impecunious client." The author states elsewhere, that "a
larger retainer would be expected from a wealthy client than
from a poor man," but on what principle i4 not made clear. The
book wisely advises against a lawyer's undertaking to explain too
fully to his client the exact legal steps which he is going to take.
Nothing can make the lawyer more ridiculous, though it flatters
the conceit of the client. Concerning the matter of contingent
fees, of making a defense of one believed to be guilty, and of
other much mooted problens, the guthor advises judiciously.
The book contains an lappendix, the American Bar Association's
Canons of Ethics, and Hoffman's Fifty Resolutions in regard to
Professional Deportment. We cordially recommend this book
to the practicing attorney .and to the student of law.

